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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 
Acting on an arrest warrant, police arrested Shamone 
Kennedy and impounded a nearby rental car that Kennedy‟s 
girlfriend had lent him a few days earlier.  Following an 
inventory search, police found two guns and 200 grams of 
cocaine inside the car.  Kennedy moved to suppress the 
evidence found in the car, contending he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in its contents.  The District Court 
denied the motion.  Because we find that the driver of a rental 
car whose name is not listed on the rental agreement 
generally lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car, 
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we conclude that Kennedy‟s suppression motion was properly 
denied.  Accordingly, we will affirm.  
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 Following the arrest of two minors in connection with 
stolen firearms, Detective Quinn of the Coatesville City 
Police Department received information indicating that some 
of those firearms had been sold for money and drugs at a 
home on First Avenue to a man known as “Tex” and later 
identified as defendant Kennedy.  Police subsequently 
obtained a warrant and searched the home on First Avenue, 
where they found guns, drugs, and personal effects belonging 
to Kennedy.  A federal warrant was issued for Kennedy‟s 
arrest on January 18, 2006.   
 
 Six days earlier, on January 12, 2006, Kennedy‟s 
girlfriend Courtney Fields had rented a silver Toyota Camry 
from Kulp Car Rental and given the key to Kennedy, who 
used the car until January 18, 2006.  Kennedy‟s name was not 
listed on the rental agreement.   
 
 On January 18, a police informant who knew Kennedy 
notified Detective Chris McEvoy that earlier in the day he 
had seen Kennedy driving a silver Toyota Camry, the car 
Fields had rented, on Chestnut Street between 7th and 8th 
Streets.  McEvoy then passed this information on to the day 
and evening shifts of the Coatesville Police Department.  
Later that evening, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Officer John 
Regan, Corporal Sean Knapp, and Sergeant Martin Brice 
encountered Kennedy—wearing black gloves and carrying in 
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his right hand a rental key inscribed with the Kulp Car Rental 
insignia and listing the car it belonged to as a silver Toyota 
Camry—walking diagonally across Chester Avenue and 
down the hill toward East Lincoln Highway.  The officers 
placed Kennedy under arrest pursuant to the warrant.  They 
then searched Kennedy and found on his person $2,692 in 
United States currency, a set of keys, and four cell phones.  
The District Court later determined that Kennedy was a 
validly licensed driver. 
 
 After Kennedy was taken to the police station, Officer 
Regan asked him where he lived.  Kennedy said he lived at 
714 East Lincoln Highway, a house less than a block from the 
location of the arrest.  Officer Regan went to that location and 
soon found a silver Camry on Chester Street with a Kulp Car 
Rental bracket around its license plate.  In the meantime, 
Sergeant Brice spoke with Kulp Car Rental‟s owner, who 
requested that the police tow the car to the police station.  
While Officer Regan waited for a tow truck, three people 
approached the car from East Lincoln Highway, at which 
time Officer Regan instructed them to move away from the 
vehicle.  The man and two women continued up the street to a 
house where they watched Officer Regan and the car from the 
front porch and window.  One of the three was Courtney 
Fields, Kennedy‟s girlfriend and the person who had rented 
the car and given Kennedy the key.  
 
 Following the car‟s impoundment, Detective Martin 
Quinn directed Corporal Scott Neuhaus to conduct an 
inventory search of the car pursuant to Department policy so 
that the vehicle could then be picked up by someone from 
Kulp.  Corporal Neuhaus began the inventory search with the 
trunk, where he found a partially opened duffle bag 
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containing a disassembled rifle in three pieces.  He 
immediately stopped the search and spoke with Detective 
Quinn, who then sought a search warrant for the entire 
vehicle.  That same day, at her request, Fields‟s attorney 
informed the police that there could be drugs in the car.  
  
 On January 20, 2006, Detective McEvoy and Detective 
Sean Murrin received a federal search warrant for the vehicle.  
Inside, the detectives found a cell phone charger plugged into 
the dashboard cigarette lighter, and a second cell phone 
charger in the passenger compartment, each of which fit one 
of the four phones found on Kennedy at the time of arrest.  
The detectives then opened the locked glove compartment 
and found a semi-automatic handgun, a magazine containing 
around 30 rounds of ammunition, and a plastic bag containing 
smaller bags with an off-white chunky substance later 
confirmed to be 202 grams of cocaine base. 
 
B. 
 
 On August 30, 2006, a grand jury indicted Kennedy on 
two counts of possession of 50 grams or more of cocaine base 
(“crack”) with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1); two counts of possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c); and two counts of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  One count of 
each crime related to the evidence obtained at the First 
Avenue address and one count of each crime to the evidence 
obtained from the silver Camry.  Kennedy filed a motion to 
suppress both the evidence obtained from the home on First 
Avenue and the evidence obtained from the Camry.  
Following a hearing, the District Court issued a written 
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opinion denying the motion.  See United States v. Kennedy, 
No. 06-23, 2007 WL 1740747 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2007).  
 
 As to the search of the home on First Avenue, the 
District Court held both that Kennedy lacked standing to 
contest the search because he had not shown any connection 
to the house, and that the search was proper because there 
was a substantial basis for the magistrate judge‟s 
determination that there was probable cause to support the 
issuance of a warrant.  Id. at *2-3.   
 
 As to the searches of the silver Camry, the District 
Court acknowledged that the Third Circuit had not yet 
directly addressed the question of whether an individual who 
borrows a rental car but is not an authorized driver under the 
rental agreement has standing to challenge a search of the 
rental car.  The District Court cited United States v. Baker, 
221 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2000), for the proposition that to 
“determin[e] whether someone who borrowed a car had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it,” a court must conduct 
a “„fact-bound‟ inquiry assessing „the strength of the driver‟s 
interest in the car and the nature of his control over it‟”  
Kennedy, 2007 WL 1740747 at *4 (quoting Baker, 221 F.3d 
at 442). 
   
 Relying on Baker, the District Court found that 
because Kennedy had Fields‟s permission to use the car, a 
driver‟s license, and was in fact driving the car on January 18, 
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.  Id.  
Nevertheless, the District Court found that under the 
circumstances, including the absence of an authorized driver 
to remove the car from the street, it was reasonable for the 
police to honor the rental company‟s request and impound the 
 
 7 
car.  Under settled law, the impoundment made it permissible 
to conduct an inventory search of the car‟s contents.  Id. at 
*4-5.  Accordingly, in light of what it found to be 
constitutionally valid procedures, the District Court denied 
Kennedy‟s Motion to Suppress in its entirety.  
 
 After three days of trial, the District Court declared a 
mistrial when the jury could not reach a verdict.  Kennedy 
was retried on only one count each of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), all relating to 
the evidence found in the car.  After a two-day trial, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on those three remaining counts. 
The District Court then sentenced Kennedy to a term of 
imprisonment of 300 months followed by a 10 year period of 
supervised release.  This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
 We “review the district court‟s denial of [a] motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise 
plenary review as to its legality in light of the court‟s properly 
found facts.”  United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 999 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 
509 (3d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“[T]he proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of 
proving not only that the search . . . was illegal, but also that 
he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in [the place 
searched].”  United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted) (second set of 
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brackets in original).
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B. 
 
 As previously stated, the District Court found that 
because Kennedy had Fields‟s permission to use the car she 
rented, Kennedy had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
its contents.  The Government argues that we should reverse 
the District Court‟s holding that Kennedy had standing to 
challenge the search of his car in the first instance.  Although 
the right to challenge a search on Fourth Amendment grounds 
is generally referred to as “standing,” the Supreme Court has 
clarified that the definition of that right “is more properly 
placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment 
law than within that of standing.”  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 140 (1978).  Accordingly, standing to challenge a search 
is not a threshold issue that must be decided before reaching 
the question of whether a search was or was not 
constitutional.  See, e.g., United States v. Varlack Ventures, 
Inc., 149 F.3d 212, 215-16 (3d Cir. 1998) (assuming, without 
deciding, that appellant had standing to challenge search but 
nevertheless reversing district court‟s suppression of 
evidence).  The Court may therefore affirm the district court 
on any ground supported by the record, whether because 
Kennedy lacked standing to challenge the search, or because 
the officers‟ search did not run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment.  E.g., United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 
168 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
                                                 
1
 We have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, pursuant to Kennedy‟s timely filing of a notice of 
appeal from the order of judgment entered on April 1, 2009. 
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 Fourth Amendment standing “requires that the 
individual challenging the search have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the property searched . . . and that 
he manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
property searched[.]”  United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d at 441 
(citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 39 (1988)).  With regard to the objective prong of 
this test, which is at issue here, a reasonable or legitimate 
expectation of privacy must have “a source outside of the 
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or 
personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”  Minnesota v. Carter, 
525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12); 
see also, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 
(2000) (“Our Fourth Amendment analysis . . . . inquire[s] 
whether the individual‟s expectation of privacy is one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted); Carter, 525 U.S. at 101 
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The application of [the 
standing] rule involves consideration of the kind of place in 
which the individual claims the privacy interest and what 
expectations of privacy are traditional and well recognized.”).   
 
 While “[e]xpectations of privacy protected by the 
Fourth Amendment . . . need not be based on a common-law 
interest in real or personal property, . . . by focusing on 
legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of 
property concepts in determining the presence or absence of 
the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.” Rakas, 
439 U.S. at 143 n.12.  Therefore, “one who owns or lawfully 
possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his] right to 
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exclude.” Id.; see also United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 
1248, 1256-57 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Recent cases . . . reflect the 
Supreme Court‟s continued consideration of property 
interests in determining Fourth Amendment privacy 
interests.”)  With these considerations in mind, we turn to the 
record before us.   
 
C. 
 
 The District Court relied on our decision in United 
States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2000), in reaching its 
conclusion that Kennedy had standing to challenge the search 
of the car.  In Baker, the defendant was arrested for driving a 
car to his parole office, because driving was an express 
violation of his parole conditions.  The parole officers 
searched the car, which was registered in someone else‟s 
name, and discovered drug paraphernalia.  The officers then 
conducted a warrantless search of Baker‟s home, in which 
they found weapons and heroin.  221 F.3d at 440-41.  
Although testimony that Baker‟s friend owned and had lent 
him the car conflicted with the identity of the owner of the car 
as listed in its title and registration, for purposes of the 
standing analysis we assumed that the defendant had 
“borrowed it from a friend and had been driving it for four to 
six weeks.” Id. at 442. 
 
 In determining whether Baker had standing, we stated 
that “whether the driver of a car has the reasonable 
expectation of privacy necessary to show Fourth Amendment 
standing is a fact-bound question dependent on the strength of 
his interest in the car and the nature of his control over it[.]”  
Id. at 442 (collecting cases).  Because he had been lent the car 
by a friend, “had been driving it for four to six weeks[,]” and 
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had “carried the keys to the car with him into the parole 
office[,]” we concluded that “Baker had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the car.”  Id. at 442-43.  Baker thus 
stands for the proposition that, in conducting the “fact-bound” 
inquiry into whether a driver has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in a car, a person who lawfully borrows a car from 
another and exercises substantial control over it may well 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy.  This, however, does 
not speak to the distinct factual scenario presented here: 
whether someone who has been given permission to drive a 
vehicle by its renter, without the knowledge of its owner and 
in contravention of the rental agreement, nevertheless has 
standing to challenge a search of that vehicle.  Accordingly, 
we disagree with Kennedy that Baker augurs in favor of any 
particular outcome here.   
 
 Instead, recognizing that the inquiry must remain 
“fact-bound,” we concur with the majority of circuits that 
have considered this factual scenario and conclude that, as a 
general rule, the driver of a rental car who has been lent the 
car by the renter, but who is not listed on the rental agreement 
as an authorized driver, lacks a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the car unless there exist extraordinary 
circumstances suggesting an expectation of privacy.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Seeley, 331 F.3d 471, 472 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(per curiam) (finding that driver of rental car lacked standing 
where he was not the renter or authorized driver); United 
States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that unauthorized driver of rental car who had been given 
permission to drive by co-defendant, an authorized driver, 
lacked standing); United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887-
88 (10th Cir. 1990) (defendant lacked standing where car he 
was driving was rented by co-defendant‟s common law wife 
 
 12 
and he was not listed as additional driver in rental contract); 
cf. United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that “as a general rule, an unauthorized driver of a 
rental vehicle does not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle” but nevertheless finding that the 
defendant had standing in light of the “truly unique” facts of 
that case). 
 
Unlike the defendant in Baker, an individual who 
borrows a rental car without the permission or knowledge of 
the owner not only acts in contravention of the owner‟s 
property rights, but also deceives the owner of the vehicle 
while increasing the risk that the property will be harmed or 
lost.  Although property law is not controlling, neither is it 
irrelevant.  See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (“Legitimation of 
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of 
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of 
real or personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”).  An authorized driver 
on the rental agreement has lawful possession of the vehicle 
and, within the scope of the rental agreement, may 
legitimately exclude others from using it.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Walker, 237 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A 
person listed as an approved driver on a rental agreement has 
an objective expectation of privacy in the vehicle due to his 
possessory and property interest in the vehicle.”).  In contrast, 
an unauthorized driver has no cognizable property interest in 
the rental vehicle and therefore no accompanying right to 
exclude.  The lack of such an interest supports the position 
that it is objectively unreasonable for an unauthorized driver 
to expect privacy in the vehicle. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 
448 U.S. 98 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that 
“[n]ot every concept of ownership or possession is „arcane‟” 
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and “„the right to exclude‟ is an essential element of modern 
property rights” that “often may be a principal determinant in 
the establishment of a legitimate Fourth Amendment 
interest”).  Accordingly, we agree with the majority of 
circuits which have considered this scenario and find that 
such circumstances will normally take one outside the well-
recognized and shared understandings of privacy in our 
society.  
 
 Kennedy urges us instead to follow the decisions of the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have held that an 
unauthorized driver of a rental car has standing where the 
renter gives him permission to use the vehicle.  See United 
States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, for the proposition that the 
unauthorized driver of a rental car has standing where given 
permission by the authorized driver, because “arcane 
distinctions developed in property . . . law . . . ought not . . . 
control” the standing inquiry); United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 
1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that if the unauthorized 
driver had permission from the renter, the driver “would have 
a privacy interest giving rise to standing”); United States v. 
Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) 
(unauthorized driver who presented no evidence that renter 
had given him permission to use rental car lacked standing, 
although evidence of “consensual possession” would have 
established standing).  
 
The Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Thomas, which 
contains the most extensive reasoning among these decisions, 
deserves particular attention.  In Thomas, a known associate 
of the defendant rented a car, listed only himself as an 
authorized driver, and then lent the car to Thomas.  447 F.3d 
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at 1194-95.  In light of these facts, the Government argued 
that Thomas lacked standing to challenge the search of the car 
because “a driver has no legal right to control or to possess a 
rental car in contravention of the lease agreement.”  Id. at 
1198.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that even 
where “an unauthorized driver may be in violation of the 
rental agreement, we have previously held that a privacy 
interest exists even if a defendant is in technical violation of a 
leasing contract.”  Id.  To support this assertion, it cited to 
cases in which courts held that a lessee of an automobile or 
motel room maintains his or her privacy interest in the 
property even where the lessee maintains possession of the 
property after the agreement has expired.  See id. (citing 
United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 647 (9th Cir. 
2000), as amended Mar. 5, 2001 (lessee of rental car has 
reasonable expectation of privacy even after expiration of 
agreement, as long as he maintains possession and control of 
the car); United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (expiration of motel room rental period, in absence 
of affirmative acts by lessor to repossess, does not 
automatically terminate lessee‟s expectation of privacy); 
United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398-1402 (11th Cir. 
1998) (renter has reasonable expectation of privacy even after 
rental car lease has expired); United States v. Owens, 782 
F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir. 1986) (motel guest maintains a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in motel room even after 
check-out time)).   
 
From the holdings of these cases, as well as the 
Supreme Court‟s admonition that “„arcane distinctions 
developed in property and tort law . . . ought not . . . control‟ 
the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy,” Thomas, 
447 F.3d at 1199 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143), the Ninth 
 
 15 
Circuit determined that “an unauthorized driver who received 
permission to use a rental car and has joint authority over the 
car may challenge the search to the same extent as the 
authorized renter.”  Id. 
 
We do not, however, find the analysis in Thomas 
persuasive.  The Ninth Circuit reasons that a lessee‟s 
“technical” violation of a lease agreement by untimely 
returning the leased property is substantially analogous to a 
violation of a lease agreement by lending that property to a 
third party who is not discussed in the lease.  Hence, it 
concludes that the two types of breach should be treated the 
same for purposes of determining whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  The persuasiveness of the 
analogy breaks down, however, when one considers the 
different risks that each type of breach creates for the 
property owner, the different precautions that owners take to 
protect against each breach, and the corresponding 
differences with which society is likely to view those 
breaches.   
 
The risk of additional harm to or loss of leased 
property is likely to be small and easily quantifiable where 
the lessee merely maintains possession of the property past 
the expiration of the lease agreement.  Indeed, because 
normally the expected loss will merely increase in proportion 
to the amount of time that the property is being used, the 
owner can easily seek compensation for this breach of the 
lease by charging an additional pro rata fee based on the 
amount of additional time that the property is used.  See 
Darren M. Goldman, Note, Resolving a Three-Way Circuit 
Split: Why Unauthorized Rental Drivers Should Be Denied 
Fourth Amendment Standing, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 1687, 1722 & 
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n.285 (2009) (citing to actual rental car contracts that 
“account for tardiness and build in penalty fees should a 
driver return the car late”).   
 
However, the risk of loss or harm is likely to be quite 
difficult to quantify, or even estimate, where an unknown and 
unauthorized individual uses the leased property.  In the 
rental car context, car rental agencies will normally require 
renters to provide information about all authorized drivers, 
such as their ages, whether they have valid driver‟s licenses, 
and access to their driving records.  Of course, there are no 
means for agencies to obtain this information for 
unauthorized drivers.  They will therefore face significantly 
higher risks because of the possibility that an unauthorized 
driver does not have a license, is a young and inexperienced 
driver, or has a history of accidents or criminal activity.   
 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit‟s reliance, in Thomas, on 
cases where the lessee of a motel room or apartment 
maintained his expectation of privacy even after the 
agreement had expired, is inapposite.  We have previously 
noted, as has the Supreme Court, that an individual generally 
has a greater expectation of privacy in his home or “living 
quarters” than he does in an automobile.  See United States v. 
Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “the 
Fourth Amendment has been repeatedly characterized by the 
Supreme Court as affording enhanced protection to the home, 
and diminished protection to vehicles.”) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted).  Accordingly, while the expectations 
of privacy of one who rents an apartment or motel room may 
survive the termination of the lease under certain 
circumstances, this does not mean that expectations of 
privacy will necessarily extend beyond the termination of a 
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rental car agreement.   
 
In light of these considerations, we believe that society 
views authorized drivers who return rental cars a few hours 
late quite differently from unauthorized drivers who borrow 
rental cars without the rental company‟s knowledge or 
permission.  While the former is a largely harmless and even 
expected occurrence that can be easily managed by the 
owner, the latter is a deceptive means of placing unbargained-
for risk of property harm and loss onto the rental company.  
Because we find the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit‟s contrary 
rule in Thomas unpersuasive, we join the majority of circuits 
in concluding that the lack of a cognizable property interest in 
the rental vehicle and the accompanying right to exclude 
makes it generally unreasonable for an unauthorized driver to 
expect privacy in the vehicle.  We therefore hold that society 
generally does not share or recognize an expectation of 
privacy for those who have gained possession and control 
over a rental vehicle they have borrowed without the 
permission of the rental company. 
 
 We do acknowledge United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 
571 (6th Cir. 2001), as an example of extraordinary 
circumstances that might overcome the general rule that we 
adopt here.  In Smith, the Sixth Circuit upheld an order 
suppressing evidence in the case of a defendant who was an 
unauthorized driver of the rental car that was searched.  
However, the defendant was also the husband of the woman 
who had rented the car four days earlier and had himself 
“personally contacted the rental car company . . . and reserved 
the vehicle in his name, using his own credit card, which was 
billed for the rental.”  Id. at 582.  The Sixth Circuit explained 
that the defendant‟s “business relationship with the rental 
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company and his intimate relationship with his wife, the 
authorized driver of the vehicle, are relationships which are 
recognized by law and society[,]” and “[b]ased on these 
relationships, as well as the fact that he personally paid for 
the vehicle, Smith had both a subjective and an objective 
legitimate expectation of privacy.”  Id. at 587.   
 
 In this case, we discern none of the extraordinary 
circumstances present in Smith.  Unlike Smith, where the 
driver “was the de facto renter of the vehicle,” here Kennedy 
“was simply granted permission by the „renter‟ of the 
vehicle.” Smith, 263 F.3d at 586-87.  Although Kennedy had 
the permission of the renter to operate the vehicle, he did not 
have the permission of the owner.  As examined above, any 
expectation of privacy he subjectively held in the vehicle was 
therefore objectively unreasonable.  Accordingly, we hold 
that Kennedy lacks standing to contest the search of the rental 
vehicle. 
 
Further, even had Kennedy pointed to such 
extraordinary circumstances, we would nevertheless find that 
he lacks standing under the particular facts here.  Because 
Kulp Car Rental, as lawful owner, informed law enforcement 
that Kennedy was an unauthorized driver and instructed them 
to impound the car until Kulp could recover it, any residual 
expectation of privacy that Kennedy might have acquired 
would have been effectively terminated by Kulp‟s directive.2   
 
                                                 
2
 Because we hold that Kennedy does not have Fourth 
Amendment standing to challenge the search of the rental car, 
we do not reach the issue of whether the impoundment of the 
car was an unconstitutional seizure. 
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III. 
 
 Finally, Kennedy challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence based upon which the jury found him guilty.  
Because Kennedy did not preserve the issue of sufficiency of 
the evidence by raising an objection at the close of the 
evidence, we will reverse only if we find plain error.  United 
States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 654-55 (3d Cir. 2006).  “We 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, and will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 657. 
 
 Kennedy contends that although the evidence 
presented at trial established that he had access to the rental 
car and the contraband in it, Fields and possibly unidentified 
others also had access to and drove the car on the day of its 
seizure.  Kennedy also cites to cases both within and outside 
the Third Circuit holding that the neither a defendant‟s mere 
proximity to contraband nor his mere presence at the property 
where contraband is located is sufficient to demonstrate the 
“dominion and control” over the contraband that is necessary 
to support a finding of actual or constructive possession.  
Having conducted a thorough and careful review of the 
record, we find that the cases relied on by Kennedy are 
inapposite and that the jury could have reasonably credited 
Fields‟s testimony that she was neither aware of nor involved 
with the contraband in the car.  We therefore conclude, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, that a reasonable jury could have found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Kennedy had both knowledge as well 
as dominion and control over the drugs and firearms found in 
the vehicle. 
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IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.   
